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During the past quarter-century, privatisation has
emerged as a very effective tool for improving the
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and
has been embraced by governments around the
world. Global privatisation proceeds rose from
US$40 billion in 1988 to a peak of US$180 billion in
2000, before sliding back to less than US$50 billion
during 2003.Last year saw a sharp rebound,however,
and global privatisation proceeds reached US$95 bil-
lion in 2004.Looking forward,it seems likely that pri-
vatisation programs will continue growing and will
expand to regions and industrial sectors that have
thus far lagged – particularly the large Asian
economies of China and India as well as the electric-
ity supply and distribution and petroleum explo-
ration and production sectors.
In general, governments launching privatisation
programs tend to have similar goals.These include:
(i) raising revenue for the state;(ii) promoting eco-
nomic efficiency; (iii) reducing government inter-
ference in the economy; (iv) promoting wider
share ownership; (v) providing the opportunity to
introduce competition; (vi) developing the nation-
al capital market; and (vii) exposing former SOEs
to market discipline. These objectives were first
articulated by the first Thatcher government in the
United Kingdom, which launched the first large-
scale privatisation program during the early 1980s,
and all subsequent governments that have em-
braced privatisation assert similar goals.
Given its economic and political importance, it is
unsurprising that privatisation has been examined
intensely by academic researchers over the past
decade. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh
(1994) document economically and statistically sig-
nificant increases in output (real sales), operating
efficiency, profitability, capital investment spend-
ing, and dividend payments, as well as significant
decreases in leverage, for their sample of compa-
nies divested by OECD countries between 1961
and 1990.Boubakri and Cosset (1998),using a sam-
ple of 79 companies privatised by developing coun-
try governments between 1980 and 1992, confirm
these results. Most subsequent empirical analyses
have also shown that privatisation tends to
improve the performance of divested companies.
The size of privatisation in different countries
After the successful initial public offering (IPO) of
British Telecom in November 1984, privatisation
became a core economic policy of all British gov-
ernments. The UK privatisation program raised
over US$120 billion between 1981 and 1995, and in-
volved completely selling off some two-dozen large
enterprises, including British Aerospace, British
Airways, British Gas, British Steel and British
Petroleum.The success of the UK privatisation pro-
gram prompted other Western European countries
to start their own privatisation programs. The
French government started divesting their SOEs
during Jacques Chirac’s first administration, and his
government privatised 22 SOEs, accounting for
US$12 billion, between 1986 and 1988. Over the
next five years, the French privatisation program
was inactive, but it became active again during the
early 1990s. France executed a series of large offer-
ings, beginning with Total in 1992 and including
Rhone-Poulenc, BNP, UAP, Usinor Sacilor and
Pechiney during 1993–95 and France Telecom in
1997. Since then the French privatisation program
has covered finance, telecommunication, manufac-
turing, petroleum and transportation industries.
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1994 and has raised over US$110 billion during this
past decade alone. Major sales included the public
offering of ENEL in 1999, which remains the
largest IPO in history, as well as massive sales of
ENI,Telecom Italia and all the major state-owned
banks.There has been a relatively small number of
large privatisations in Germany, but these still
include Deutsche Telecom, Lufthansa, Deutsche
Post, and Deutsche Bahn. Perhaps the most spec-
tacular and concentrated privatisation programs
have been implemented by the Iberian countries
Spain and Portugal, which transformed both eco-
nomies from highly interventionist to truly market
based during a few years of the 1990s. Large
Spanish sales included Telefonica, ENDESA,
Argentaria, and Empresa Nacional de Autopistas.
Portuguese companies were smaller, but the pri-
vatisation program was even larger as a fraction of
total economic output.
Asian privatisation programs have been led by
Japan since it began divesting Japan Air Lines in
1985 and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone in 1987.
In fact, the three Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
share offerings between February 1987 and Octo-
ber 1988 raised almost US$80 billion, and one of
those three offerings remains the largest single
security offering in history at US$40 billion. Else-
where in Asia, governments tried to exploit oppor-
tunities to privatise their SOEs when market con-
ditions were attractive, or when there was a need
to raise cash to reduce budget deficits. As noted
earlier,however,the two Asian countries that loom
the largest in terms of privatisation potential are
China and India.There have been numerous small
partial divestments by the Chinese government,
but there have been relatively few outright sales of
SOEs. Furthermore, Chinese SOEs are typically
burdened with many social welfare responsibilities
that make it far more difficult to implement a true
privatisation program.There is an interesting phe-
nomenon in China where the non-privatising
reform measures, such as price deregulation, mar-
ket liberalisation and increased use of incentives,
can improve the efficiency of SOEs, but it is likely
that these reforms would be even more effective if
coupled with privatisation. Since 2000, the Chinese
privatisation program has picked up considerable
momentum, and the list of large partial divest-
ments includes Unicom, Bank of China, China
Telecom, Petro China, China Unicom and Sinopec.
India adopted a major economic reform and liber-
alisation program after a major economic crisis in
1991.The reform program first tried to improve the
poor performance of India’s SOEs, then attempted
to privatise several of the larger companies. The
government’s attempt to divest the SOEs was
resisted fiercely by labour groups and politicians,
who were afraid of losing control. India finally pri-
vatised Bharat Aluminum Co (BALCO) in 2001,
and many other sales are scheduled to take place in
the future.
Elsewhere in Asia, Singapore has also been divest-
ing SOEs. Interestingly, privatisation does not
appear to significantly improve the performance of
Singaporean firms because Singaporean SOEs
were unusually well managed before divestment.
There was only one large privatisation implement-
ed in Singapore which is the privatisation of
Singapore Telecom. Taiwan has been trying, with
signal lack of success, to privatise Hunghwa Tele-
com for several years, but has been stymied by the
government’s reluctance to offer any pricing dis-
counts on the sales. On the other hand, Korea was
forced into nationalising numerous private compa-
nies following the 1997–98 economic crisis, and has
since been busily – and successfully – selling most
of these and its remaining SOEs to private buyers.
Latin America truly embraced privatisation during
the 1990s, though its ardour has cooled significant-
ly during the past five years. Chile’s program was
particularly important, both because it was Latin
America’s first and because the 1990 Telefonos de
Chile privatisation, which used a large American
Depository Receipt (ADR) share tranche that was
targeted towards US investors, opened the first
important pathway for developing countries to
directly tap Western capital markets. Mexico’s pro-
gram was both vast in scope and remarkably suc-
cessful at reducing the state’s role in what had been
a highly interventionist economy. La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) report that, in 1988, Mexi-
can SOEs contributed 14 percent of GDP, received
net transfers and subsidies equal to 12.7 percent of
GDP and accounted for 38 percent of fixed capital
investment. By June 1992, the government had pri-
vatised 361 of its roughly 1,200 SOEs and the need
for subsidies had been virtually eliminated.Several
other countries in Latin America have also execut-
ed large divestment programs. For example,
Bolivia’s innovative “capitalisation” scheme has
been widely acclaimed. However, the most impor-
tant program in the region is Brazil’s. Given the
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size of Brazil’s economy and its privatisation pro-
gram, and the fact that the government has been
able to sell several very large SOEs (CVRD in
1997 and Telebras in 1998) in spite of significant
political opposition, this country’s program has
been very influential.
Privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been some-
thing of a stealth economic policy. Few govern-
ments claim to be actively privatising, but more
sales have occurred than most people think.Nigeria
has been one of the most frequent sellers of SOEs,
using public share offerings, although they were
very small. The experience of the African National
Congress after it came to power in South Africa
also shows the policy realities that governments
with interventionist instincts face in this new era.
Though nationalisation and redistribution of
wealth have been central planks of ANC ideology
for decades, the Mandela and Mbeki governments
have almost totally refrained from nationalisations,
and have even sold off several SOEs (though use of
the word “privatisation” remains taboo).
The last major region to adopt privatisation pro-
grams comprises the former Soviet-bloc countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries
began privatising SOEs as part of a broader effort
to transform themselves from command into mar-
ket economies. Therefore, they faced the most dif-
ficult challenges and had the most restricted set of
policy choices.After the collapse of communism in
1989–91, all of the newly elected governments of
the region were under pressure to create some-
thing resembling a market economy as quickly as
possible. However, political considerations essen-
tially required these governments to significantly
limit foreign purchases of divested assets.Since the
region had little financial savings, these twin
imperatives compelled many – though not all –
governments throughout the region to launch
“mass privatisation” programs. These programs
generally involved distributing vouchers to the
population,which citizens could then use to bid for
shares in companies being privatised. Although
these programs resulted in a massive reduction of
state ownership and were initially popular politi-
cally, they became unpopular in many countries
(especially Russia) because of the largely correct
perception that they were robbery by the old elite
and the new oligarchs. The net effect of voucher
privatisation programs has varied, ranging from
disappointing to disastrous.
Although different regions have embraced privatisa-
tion at varying speeds, governments have found the
lure of revenue from sales of SOEs to be attractive –
which is one reason the policy has spread so rapidly.
According to Privatisation International (Henry
Gibbon 1998,2000),the cumulative value of proceeds
raised by privatising governments exceeded US$1
trillion sometime during the second half of 1999. By
the end of 2004, the cumulative amount raised had
surpassed US$1.25 trillion.Approximately two-thirds
of this total has been raised by Western European
governments. As an added benefit, this revenue has
come to governments without raising taxes or cutting
other public services.
The historical discussion above suggests that state
ownership has been substantially reduced since
1979, and in many countries this has occurred.
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) report that the
role of state-owned enterprises in the economies of
high-income (industrialized) countries has de-
clined significantly, from about 8.5 percent of GDP
in 1984 to less than 6 percent in 1991. The low-
income countries show an even more dramatic
reduction in state ownership. From a high point of
almost 16 percent of GDP, the average SOE share
of national output dropped to barely 7 percent in
1995 and has probably dropped to about 5 percent
since then.The middle-income countries also expe-
rienced significant reductions in state ownership
during the 1990s. Since the upper- and lower-mid-
dle-income groups include the transition eco-
nomies of Central and Eastern Europe,this decline
was expected given the extremely high beginning
levels of state ownership.
The impact of privatisation on financial markets
Privatisation programs have always been adopted at
least partly in order to develop national capital mar-
kets.The logic underlying this expectation is that pri-
vatisation through public share offerings will signifi-
cantly increase both the amount of common equity
outstanding and the volume of share trading.
Empirical research now clearly documents that share
issue privatisation (SIP) programs do indeed develop
stock market trading and new share listings. Table 1
describes the growth in the total market capitalisa-
tion, and in the value of shares traded, on the world’s
stock exchanges from 1983 to 2003.Much of this peri-
od witnessed rapid growth in the capitalisation of
markets in every country except Japan, which suf-fered a four-year, 70 percent
decline in total market capital-
isation after reaching a value
of US$4.4 trillion in 1989.Total
world market capitalisation
increased over ten-fold (to
US$35.0 trillion) between 1983
and 1999, and the total capital-
isation of the US market in-
creased almost nine-fold (from
US$1.9 trillion to US$16.6 tril-
lion) over the same period.
The growth in markets outside
the United States was even
greater. It is also in these mar-
kets where privatisation’s im-
pact has been greatest, since
there have been only two sig-
nificant SIPs in the United
States in the modern era (Con-
rail in 1987 and US Enrich-
ment Corporation in 1999).
Between 1983 and 1999, the
total capitalisation of non-US
stock markets increased from
US$1.49 trillion to US$18.36
trillion. This fell to US$11.8
trillion in 2003, but has since
rebounded back over US$17
trillion. The total market capi-
talisation of developing coun-
try stock exchanges increased
by 26 times between 1983 and
2003.Developing country mar-
ket capitalisation fell by more
than half between 1999 and
2001, but has since rebounded
to record levels.
The increase in market capi-
talisation since 1983 has been
accompanied by an even lar-
ger increase in trading vol-
umes.The total value of shares
traded worldwide between
1983 and 2003 rose from
US$1.2 trillion to US$33.3 tril-
lion. As before, non-US mar-
kets experienced the greatest
increases, where the value of
shares traded on developing
countries financial markets
increased from US$25 billion
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in 1983 to US$1.5 trillion in
2003.
What role has privatisation played
in this remarkable growth in mar-
ket capitalisation and trading vol-
ume? At the end of 1983,the total
market capitalisation of the hand-
ful of British, Chilean and Singa-
porean firms that had been priva-
tised was less than US$50 billion.
By the middle of 2000,the 152 pri-
vatised firms listed in either the
Business Week “Global 1000”
ranking of the most valuable com-
panies in developed-nation stock
markets or the Business Week
“Top 200 Emerging Market Com-
panies” ranking had a total mar-
ket capitalisation of US$3.31 tril-
lion. This equals approximately 
13 percent of the combined mar-
ket capitalisation of the firms on
the two lists, and is more than 
27 percent of the non-US total.
Privatised firms accounted for an
even higher percentage of total
non-US stock valuation in the
July 2004 Business Week Global
1000 ranking.
An examination of the historical
evolution of non-US stock mar-
kets since 1980 suggests that
large SIPs played a key role in
the growth of capital markets
almost everywhere, especially
because they are generally among the largest firms
in national markets. Using the Business Week 2004
Global 1000 data, Table 2 details the total market
value and relative size of the world’s 25 most valu-
able privatised firms. Columns 1 and 2 give the
company names and domicile countries. Column 3
shows each firm’s ranking in the Global 1000 list.
Column 4 gives the firm’s ranking within its home
market, and column 5 lists the firm’s total market
capitalisation. Column 6 expresses the single firm’s
market capitalisation as a percentage of the entire
national market’s year-end 2003 capitalisation.
Table 2 and a study by Boutchkova and Megginson
(2000) disclose the relative importance of SIPs in
most non-US financial markets. Privatised firms
are the most valuable companies in Britain,France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, Singapore,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Priva-
tised companies are the three most valuable com-
panies in nine countries, including France, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, China, Russia, Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic.
Another way to measure the impact of privatised
firms on capital market development is to see how
important SIPs have been as security offerings, and
here the impact is even greater.Table 3 shows that the
11 largest share offerings and 28 out of the 30 largest
share offerings in history have been privatisations.
Since 1984 there have been some 125 SIPs that raised
Table 2






value as Company Name
rank rank million US$ % market
BP UK 7 1 193,054 3.56
Total France 23 1 122,945 8.26
NTT DoCoMo Japan 32 2 92,165 1.59
ENI Italy 37 1 82,072 10.37
NTT Japan 40 3 79,016 1.37
Telefonica Spain 45 1 72,078 7.65
Gazprom Russia 47 1 70,784 42.06
Deutsche Telecom Germany 48 1 70,535 5.89
Aventis France 59 2 63,654 4.27
France Telecom France 64 3 59,248 3.98
China Mobile Hong Kong 70 1 56,664 6.58
BNP Paribas France 71 4 55,724 3.74
Enel Italy 86 2 49,606 6.27
EON Germany 89 4 48,116 4.02
ING Groep Netherlands 92 2 46,576 11.70
TIM Italy 93 3 46,528 5.88
Banco BilbaoVizcaya
Argentaria Spain 102 3 44,844 4.76
Telefonica Moviles Spain 103 4 44,580 4.73
Telecom Italia Italy 105 4 43,987 5.56
Telstra Australia 112 2 42,264 5.49
Societe Generale France 126 7 37,198 2.50
Axa France 131 8 36,612 2.46
Credit Agricole France 132 9 36,276 2.44
Assicurazioni Generali Italy 147 5 33,143 4.19
National Australia
Bank Australia 162 3 32,465 4.22
Notes: Stock market value, total sales and total profits – in millions of US
dollars (translated at the contemporaneous exchange rate) – of the 25 most
valuable publicly-tradedprivatised firms as of 31 May 2004.
Sources: Data are from Morgan Stanley Capital International, as reported in
“The Business Week Global 1000”, Business Week ( 9 July 2004). Global 1000
rank refers to the company’s global ranking based on market valuation, while
country rank refers to its relative position among those firms from their coun-
try on the Global 1000 List.at least US$1 billion, which is a size that rarely hap-
pens, even in the United States, and 28 SIPs have
raised more than US$7 billion.
The importance of knowing the impact of privati-
sation on the development of financial markets
comes from knowing that new share listings can
directly create some net new wealth and a handful
of new (albeit well-paying) jobs. However, the
principal economic payoff from increasingly effi-
cient and liquid capital markets comes from the
financing opportunities and monitoring possibili-
ties they provide. Many empirical studies conclude
that efficient capital markets promote economic
growth and will allow individual firms to fund
investment opportunities they otherwise would
have to forgo. Therefore, privatisation deserves
credit for whatever direct role it has played in pro-
moting stock market development (through new
share offerings), and for the indirect role it has
played in bond market development.This catalytic
role can be assumed because several studies find
development of one market also promotes devel-
opment of related markets.
The impact of privatisation on corporate governance
Before we can answer the question of how privatisa-
tion impacts corporate governance,we need to under-
stand several findings that affect
the interpretation of the effects of
privatisation. First, there is
increasing interest in corporate
governance and securities laws.
This is caused by the large in-
crease in the total value of securi-
ty issues on global capital mar-
kets and the increase in mergers
and acquisitions around the
world. Second, poor corporate
governance played a major role
in the East Asian economic con-
traction beginning in July 1997.
Finally, studies by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999 and
2000) and by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2000a and
2000b) provide us with evidence
that corporate governance in
general and corporate legal sys-
tems in particular, significantly
influence capital market size,
ownership structure and efficien-
cy. The differences between legal
protections to investors in differ-
ent countries will affect the devel-
opment and operation of external
capital markets. Countries with
common law systems, that pro-
vide better investor protection,
unsurprisingly have more devel-
oped financial markets than do
countries with civil law systems
that provide weaker investor pro-
tection. While Rajan (2000) sug-
gests there might be some other
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Table 3







Nov 87 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 40,260 SEO
Oct 88 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 22,400 SEO
Nov 99 ENEL Italy 18,900 IPO
Oct 98 NTT DoCoMo Japan 18,000 IPO
Mar 03 France Telecom France 15,800 SEO
a)
Oct 97 Telecom Italia Italy 15,500 SEO
Feb 87 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 15,097 IPO
Nov 99 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 15,000 SEO
Jun 00 Deutsche Telekom Germany 14,760 SEO
Nov 96 Deutsche Telekom Germany 13,300 IPO
Oct 87 British Petroleum United Kingdom 12,430 SEO
Apr 00 ATT Wireless (tracking stock) United States 10,600 IPO
N o v9 8 F r a n c eT e l e c o m F r a n c e 10,500 SEO
Nov 97 Telstra Australia 10,530 IPO
Oct 99 Telstra Australia 10,400 SEO
Jun 99 Deutsche Telekom Germany 10,200 SEO
Dec 90 Regional Electricity Companies
b) United Kingdom 9,995 IPO
Dec 91 British Telecom United Kingdom 9,927 SEO
Oct 04 ENEL Italy 9,600 SEO
Jun 00 Telia Sweden 8,800 IPO
Dec 89 U.K. Water Authorities
b) United Kingdom 8,679 IPO
Feb 01 NTT DoCoMo Japan 8,200 SEO
Dec 86 British Gas UnitedKingdom 8,012 IPO
Jun 98 Endesa Spain 8,000 SEO
Jul 97 ENI Italy 7,800 SEO
Apr 00 Oracle Japan Japan 7,500 IPO
Jul 93 BritishTelecom U.K. 7,360 SEO
Oct 93 Japan Railroad East Japan 7,312 IPO
Dec 98 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 7,300 SEO
Oct 97 France Telecom France 7,080 IPO
Notes: Offers are reported in nominal amounts (not inflation-adjusted) and are
translated into millions of US dollars (million US$) using the contemporaneous
exchange rate. Private-sector offerings are presented in bold face, italicized
type, while share issue privatizations (SIPs) are presented innormal typeface.
a) Rights offering, in which the French government participated proportionately,
so not a SIP in the traditional sense. Though a share offering by a state-owned
firm, government ownership did not decline. –
b) Indicates a group offering of 
multiple companies that trade separately after the IPO.
Source: Table 12 of William L. Megginson andJeffry M. Netter. 2001. “From
State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization”, Journalof 
Economic Literature 39, 321–89. Updatedby author.
Source of the data: Amounts reported for SIP offers are as described in the Fi-
nancial Times at the time of the issue. Private-sector offering amounts are from
the Securities Data Corporation file or Financial Times.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 9
Forum
factors correlated with the legal system of a country
that might explain the above findings,the legal system
clearly impacts the operation of financial markets and
corporate governance in a country.
Likewise, the structure and operation of a coun-
try’s legal system will affect the impact of privati-
sation. Privatisation is often the catalyst for major
change in the governance structure of a firm. The
success of privatisation is partially determined by
how well the legal system protects investors (Sachs,
Zinnes and Eilat 2000). This assumption is sup-
ported by the evidence in the transition economies
case (Djankov and Murrell 2000a, 2000b). Further-
more,privatisation usually accompanies changes in
a country’s legal system. Privatisation also changes
the legal system in many countries. There is a ten-
dency for governments to sell shares to a large
number of citizens (often one million or more).
Therefore democratic governments are usually
acutely aware of the political fall-out that could
result if small investors suffer losses on their SIP
investments because of the inadequate sharehold-
er protection or insider dealings. Thus, when the
governments initiate the privatisation program,
they want to make sure that they establish a prop-
erly functioning regulatory body and adequate
legal protection for investors.
At the beginning of large privatisation programs,
national stock exchanges are often illiquid and
non-transparent.This forces governments to estab-
lish listing and other regulations that will assure
potential investors that the market is a reputable
place to invest and trade. Jones, Megginson, Nash
and Netter (1999) find that sometimes govern-
ments like to retain some kind of decisive voting
rights in privatised firms, even after a majority of
the income rights have been sold. For example,
90 percent of British SIPs have allowed govern-
ment to retain a golden share.Government can use
this special share to veto mergers, liquidations,
asset sales and other major corporate events. An
alternative method of retaining ultimate control is
for the government to insert some control restric-
tions directly into the SIP’s charter.
Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) evaluate the
development of share ownership in large SIPs.
They examine how many individual stockholders
are created in a sample of large SIPs,as well as how
the ownership structures change over time. They
find that privatised companies emerge with larger
numbers of shareholders than do matching private-
sector companies with similar capitalisation. This
result holds even though in most cases govern-
ments retain sizable stakes in these firms, thus
reducing their effective total capitalisation since
these stakes have not yet been sold to private
investors.They conclude that the number of share-
holders in the privatised companies is significantly
higher than the number of shareholders in the
matching private-sector (non-privatised) sample
companies. Examining how the total number of
shareholders in a company evolves during the
years following the SIP, they demonstrate that the
extremely large numbers of shareholders created
by many SIPs are not a stable pattern of corporate
ownership. For SIPs with less than 100,000 initial
investors, the number of shareholders increases
steadily from one year to four years after the pri-
vatisation. However, for the 39 SIPs that initially
have more than 100,000 shareholders, the total
number of shareholders declines steadily.The total
number of shareholders in the largest privatisa-
tions (those with 500,000 or more initial investors)
declines by 33 percent within five years of the
share offering.
The implications of this finding for government
efforts to develop an effective corporate gover-
nance system or equity culture are unclear. Many
new stockholders do not retain the shares they pur-
chase. Other evidence suggests that retail investors
in privatisations generally own only that one stock,
hardly indicative of a class of well diversified
stockholders.On the other hand,since the long-run
returns to investors in SIPs are generally positive,
the first experience of these new retail investors in
stock market trading is a positive one. Further-
more, the fact that governments are able to entice
large numbers of investors to return for subse-
quent share offerings suggests that these programs
are indeed creating (at least minimally) effective
governance systems and stock markets capable of
absorbing large new stock issues.
“Lessons” from privatisation 
The existing literature on privatisation suggests the
following conclusions:
1. Over the last twenty-five years, privatisation
programs have significantly reduced the role of
SOEs in most countries.The SOE share of “glo-bal GDP” has declined from more than ten per-
cent in 1979 to less than six percent today.
2. Current research supports the proposition that
privately owned firms are more efficient and
more profitable than otherwise-comparable
SOEs. There is limited empirical evidence, espe-
cially from China, that suggests that non-privatis-
ing reform measures, such as price deregulation,
market liberalisation and increased use of incen-
tives, can improve the efficiency of SOEs, but it
seems likely that these reforms would be even
more effective if coupled with privatisation.
3. There are three basic techniques that govern-
ments use to privatise their SOEs: share issue
privatisations (SIPs), asset sales and voucher or
mass privatisations. We are beginning to under-
stand the determinants of the method selected
in specific circumstances. However, there is
great variation within all the techniques, be-
cause privatisation is a complex process involv-
ing a host of political and economic factors. For
example, voucher privatisations are the least
economically productive divestment technique,
but those governments that use it generally have
few other realistic options.
4. Governments attempt to craft the offering
terms of SIPs to balance competing economic,
political, and financial objectives. Most govern-
ments underprice share offerings (particularly
initial offerings) and then use targeted share
allocations to favour domestic over foreign in-
vestors. SOE employees are particularly fa-
voured, receiving preferential allocations in 
91 percent of offers. Governments frequently
retain golden shares that give them veto power
over certain control changes,and also insert var-
ious other control restrictions into the corporate
charters of privatised firms.
5. Privatisation “works” in the sense that divested
firms almost always become more efficient, more
profitable, increase their capital investment
spending and become financially healthier.These
results hold for both transition and non-transi-
tion economies, though the results vary more in
the transition economies.The question of wheth-
er privatisation generally costs at least some
SOE workers their jobs are still unresolved. The
answer is ultimately based on whether sales
increase faster than productivity in privatised
firms. Most studies find that employment in pri-
vatised firms usually does fall, though three
large-sample studies document employment in-
creases. What is clear is that whenever employ-
ment is cut, there is almost invariably a large
compensating performance improvement. Sev-
eral studies also highlight the need to bring new
entrepreneurial management into privatised
firms to maximize performance improvements.
However, there is little empirical evidence on
how privatisation affects consumers.
6. Investors who purchase initial SIP shares at the
offering price and then sell those shares at the
first post-issue trading price earn significantly
positive excess (market-adjusted) returns. Ad-
ditionally, there is now convincing evidence that
initial returns on privatisation IPOs are signifi-
cantly higher than the initial returns earned on
private-sector IPOs.Investors who purchase pri-
vatisation IPO shares at their first post-offer
trading price and then retain those shares for
one-, three-, or five-year holding periods also
earn significantly positive net returns.
7. Though it is difficult to pinpoint causality, it
appears that countries that have launched large-
scale SIP programs have experienced rapid
growth in their national stock market capitalisa-
tion and trading volume. Countries (other than
the United States) that have either not launched
major privatisation programs or have empha-
sised asset sales and vouchers over public share
offerings appear to lag behind in market devel-
opment. Privatised firms are one of the two or
three most valuable companies in most non-US
markets, and the 10 largest (and 30 of the 35 lar-
gest) share issues in financial history have all
been privatisations.
8. Emerging (largely anecdotal) evidence suggests
that adopting a large-scale SIP program is often
a major spur to modernising a nation’s corpo-
rate governance system. Transition economies
that launch privatisation programs must create
such systems largely from scratch, and the
record of success here is decidedly mixed. Many
governments try to develop an equity culture
among their citizenry through SIP programs,
also with mixed results. Share ownership has
dramatically increased in most non-transition
countries over the past 15 years, but the share
ownership patterns that are created when SIPs
are sold to large numbers of investors (often
one million or more) are not stable. However, it
seems clear that privatisation programs lead to
significant improvements in securities market
regulation, information disclosure rules and
other required components of modern financial
systems.
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